The Paper
In this note we will discuss the paper "Manufacturer's Returns Policies and Retail Competition" by Padmanabhan and Png (1997) PP hereafter published in Marketing Science.
PP consider a market where a monopoly upstream manufacturer sells through one or two downstream retailers. The product has limited shelf life. The retailers face linear demand curves.
At page 83-84, the paper defines a three-stage game:
The manufacturer sets distribution policy, which includes a uniform wholesale price and possibly a returns policy; 2. Given the manufacturer's distribution policy, the retailer(s) decide how much stock to order; 3. With stocks in hand, the retailer(s) set prices to the final consumers.
The central points of the paper can be summarized as follow. It first considers a benchmark where there is a single retailer. It is shown that a returns policy makes no difference in that case.
Then the paper studies the case with two competing retailers. It finds a returns police intensifies the downstream competition, therefore leads to higher profits for the manufacturer. Notations include marginal production cost c , wholesale price w , retail price p , and retail stock s . 
Returns Policies and Retail Competition
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) study a two-stage oligopoly game. In that game, competing firms first simultaneously choose production quantities. After the production levels are made is not reasonable, because it deprives the retailers the right to choose optimal stocks at the second stage. In fact, it is still in the retailers' interest to use stocks as quantities pre-commitment in order to uphold prices at the third stage. For example, suppose both retailers provide exactly identical services to consumers. According to PP, the downstream price competition should result in competitive outcome, which means zero profits for both retailers. However, if either retailer ordered stock less than competitive level at the second stage, both retailers would make positive profits. Hence ordering "insufficient" stock makes the retailers better off.
In the game with returns, PP find the "equilibrium" wholesale price ) Assuming the retailers do not order excess stocks, PP find the manufacturer makes more profit with returns. This result is incorrect because of the problematic method used. The following two claims represent the finding of this research note. Claim 1 shows that the "equilibrium" found by PP is not an equilibrium. Claim 2 shows that returns policies make no difference in equilibrium. s s ) are not troubling.
Claim 1 Starting from stocks

Claim 2 In the game with returns, the equilibrium is the same as that without returns.
Proof: (please see the appendix)
Claim 2 shows that the retailers still play a Cournot-like game, but not a Bertrand game. That means the retailers still use stocks as quantities pre-commitment even if the manufacturer accepts returns. Particularly, they never order excess stocks.
Conclusion
The paper by Padmanabhan and Png (1997) claims that returns policies intensify retail competition. This result cannot be reached if the model is solved correctly. The paper unreasonably assumes the retailers never face stock constraints when they are offered returns policies. As Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) demonstrate, firms can use quantity pre-commitment to achieve Cournot-like outcome, even if they engage in price competition at the final stage of the game. A returns policy cannot change this story, particularly when demand is certain. Due to the problematic method to solve the model, PP (1997) incorrectly alters the game with returns from a Cournot-like game to a Bertrand game. Singh and Vives (1984) show that in a differentiated duopoly, price competition is more intense than quantity competition, provided the goods are substitutes. If the game with returns were treated as a Bertrand game, we would observe more intense retail competition, which leads to higher upstream profit. PP (1997) provides empirical evidence that returns policies narrow retail margins. But the implication of this note is that we cannot attribute that to intensified retail competition. The demand uncertainty theories (Marvel and Peck [1995] ) might explain that better. Economics, Vol.15, No.4, [546] [547] [548] [549] [550] [551] [552] [553] [554] There is a typo in 
